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By letter of 9 November 1989 the Political Affairs Committee requested 
authorization to draw up a report on the political situation in Southern 
Africa. 
At the sitting of 11 December 1989 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that the committee had been authorized to report on this subject. 
At its meeting of 7 November 1989 the committee had appointed Mr Capucho 
rapporteur. 
At the sitting of 15 December 1989 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that he had also requested the Committee on Development and 
Cooperation to deliver an opinion. 
At its meetings of 21 March 1990, 17 July 1990, 20 September 1990, 16 October 
1990, 8 November 1990 and 18 December 1990 the committee considered the draft 
report. 
At lhe last meeting lhe comrn1ltee adopted lhe rnol1on for a re-:;olulion by 20 
votes to 11, with 3 abstentions. 
The following were present: Crampton, acting chairman; van den Brink, third 
vice-chairman; Capucho, rapporteur; Alliot-Marie, Aglietta, Aulas, Balfe, 
Belo, Bethell, Blot, Cassanmagnago Cerretti, Cheysson, Coates, Cravinho, 
Ephremidis, Ferrer, Habsburg, Hansch, Herman, Klepsch, Lalor, Langer, Lenz, 
McMahon, Martin, Medina Ortega, Muller, Newens, Newton Dunn, Oostlander, 
Penders, Piermont, Pirkl, Poettering, Romeos, Sakellariou, Trivelli, Vecchi, 
Verde i Aldea, von Wechmar (for Morodo Leoncio) and White. 
The opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation is attached to 
this report. 
The report was tabled on 19 December 1990. 
The deadline for tabling amendments wi 11 appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the political situation in Southern Africa 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to its previously adopted resolutions on Southern Africa of 
15 February 19901 and of 14 June 19902 , 
having regard to the statements made by European Political Cooperation on 
12 February 1990, 20 February 1990, 6 April 1990 and 14 September 1990, 
having regard to the statements made by the European Council in December 
1989 and June 1990, 
having regard to Rule 121 of the Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee and the 
opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (A3-369/90), 
A. whereas development and lasting peace in Southern Africa are inseparable 
from the po 1 it i ca 1 processes in progress in each of the States in the 
region, namely the consolidation of independence in Namibia, the ending of 
armed conflict in Angola and Mozambique and the dismantling of apartheid 
in the Republic of South Africa, 
B. whereas the international community comprising the UN, the front line 
countries, the EEC and its Member States, the USA and the USSR may without 
interference play an increasingly important part in encouraging and 
supporting the peace and democratization processes in progress in Southern 
Africa, 
regarding Namibia: 
C. whereas the New York agreements of December 1988 were decisive in creating 
a new political dynamism with concrete results throughout Southern Africa, 
since they not only guided Namibia's independence process, but also solved 
such problems as the gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops and dismantling of 
SWAPO bases in Angola and the military withdrawal of South Africa, back to 
their own countries, 
D. whereas the elections in Namibia for a constituent assembly were 'fair and 
free', an opinion confirmed by the European Parliament special delegation 
which visited the area for this purpose, 
E. whereas this demonstrates once more that it is a mistake and offensive to 
maintain that universal suffrage and a multiparty system are unsuitable 
for certain African cultures, 
1 OJ No. C 68, 19.3.90, p. 135 
2 OJ No. C 175, 16.7.90, p. 161 
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F. whereas it also proved that resolving conflicts by negotiation is the only 
solution compatible with the best interests of the populations involved, 
G. mindful of the positive way in which the Namibian Constituent Assembly 
fulfilled its role in a spirit of reconciliation, decisively aided by the 
spirit of cooperation shown by the parties involved and in particular by 
the constructive attitude displayed by SWAPO, 
H. mindful of the statement by the European Council in Strasbourg, 
reaffirming the readiness of the Community and its Member States to 
support the development of an independent Namibia with ample aid 
programmes and expressing a willingness to welcome Namibia as a member of 
the new Lome Convention, should Namibia wish to accede to it, 
I. whereas the Security Council accepted Namibia as the 160th member of the 
UN on 18 April 1990, by a unanimous decision, 
J. whereas there is still a sensitive territorial dispute between Namibia and 
South Africa, which is continuing to administer the enclave of Walvis Bay, 
claimed by the Namibian constitution itself as an integral part of 
national territory, and UN Resolution 435 failed to solve this issue, but 
referred it back for direct negotiations between the two States involved, 
regarding Angola: 
K. whereas there has been a civil war in Angola for the last 15 years between 
the RPA Government (People's Republic of Angola) and UNITA (the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola), 
L. whereas the Government of Angola committed itself to the New York 
agreements and to compliance therewith, despite the huge social and 
economic costs to the country that this entailed, 
M. regretting that the Gbadolite agreement negotiated through the mediation 
of President Mobutu of Zaire has failed to produce a lasting cease-fire, 
of being clearly misapplied in practice, 
N. whereas, in a statement on 6 April 1990, European Political Cooperation 
called for an immediate cease-fire and for direct talks between the 
parties involved, undertaking to provide substantial and effective aid for 
the reconstruction and economic and social development of Angola as soon 
as the peace process allowed, 
0. concerned that Angola has recently been struck by widespread famine, 
exacerbated by drought, over a 1 arge part of its terri tory, where the 
people are afflicted by nearly thirty years of war; noting also the prompt 
response by the international community in providln<J emergency 
humanitarian ald to those suffering from famine, and recogniLing that the 
success of current operations is due solely to the opening of 'peace 
corr1 dors' agreed by the disputing parties to facilitate access to the 
stricken areas, 
P. mindful of the conclusions of the Central Committee of the MPLA regarding 
proposals for constitutional reform to be submitted to Congress in 
December, which are aimed at the adoption of a multiparty system, 
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Q. whereas the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angolan territory, which was 
suspended in summer 1989, has since been resumed and is due to be 
completed by July 1991, 
R. drawing attention to the flexibility displayed by UNITA in recogn1z1ng the 
State of Angola and the President of the Republic, while at the same time 
showing no interest in taking part in the transitional government pending 
elections, 
S. recalling that, in addition to the MPIA {the governing party) and UNITA {a 
movement which took up armed struggle), there are other political forces 
in the country which, until recently, were unable to express their views. 
T. whereas direct talks have been initiated between the conflicting parties 
as a result of Portuguese diplomacy, 
u. whereas the ceasefire in Angola 
social, economic and political 
particular through the holding 
unified army. 
regarding Mozambique 
is a prerequisite for the normalization of 
life in the country, to be achieved in 
of free elections and the creation of a 
V. whereas soon after achieving independence in 1975, Mozambique too was 
affected by armed conflict, with the emergence in 1977 of RENAMO 
{Mozambique National Resistance) a movement initially backed by the 
Republic of South Africa- which waged a campaign of guerrilla attacks on 
military, economic and civilian targets, 
W. whereas Mozambique is now in a very serious situation with widespread 
famine which is producing the highest level of general malnutrition in the 
world today and an estimated total of more than 3 million refugees from 
the conflict, about 1.2 million of whom have fled to Malawi, Zimbabwe and 
the Republic of South Africa, 
X. drawing attention to the attempted mediation by African Heads of State 
during the first series of talks between the parties in dispute, which was 
unfortunately unsuccessful, 
V. whereas the preliminary draft constitutional rev1s1on adopted at the 
beginning of September by the Central Committee of FRELIMO and by the 
Mozambican Parliament, heralded fundamental reforms such as the adoption 
of a multiparty system, abolition of the leading role of the Party and 
guaranteeing freedom of expression and of the press, 
z. whereas direct negotiations between the disputing parties were finally 
initiated in Rome in June this year under the auspices of the Catholic 
Church {Community of Saint Giles), 
Za. whereas, although the results of the first meeting were unspectacular, the 
parli es involved expressed their commitment to es tab I i shi ng a common 
working platform to put an end lo the conflict and bring about the 
appropriate political, economic and social conditions for achieving peace 
and normalizing the life of all Mozambicans, 
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Zb. welcoming the reopening of direct negotiations between the disputing 
parties under the auspices of the Catholic Church and the Italian 
Government and noting the preliminary agreement concluded on 1 December 
1990 concerning the presence and role of the Zimbabwean army during the 
period leading up to the cease-fire, 
regarding the Republic of South Africa: 
Zc. whereas, s i nee the e 1 ect ion of President De Kl erk on 14 September 1989, 
the South African Government has displayed considerable courage and a 
clear willingness to undertake political reforms and take steps towards 
the dismantling of apartheid, 
Zd. whereas these measures make an invaluable contribution to bringing about 
the conditions necessary for a broad national dialogue aimed at 
establishing a new constitutional order, 
Ze. whereas, the substance of any pol it i ca 1 change in South Africa is now 
dependent on negotiations between the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and organizations representing the population, such as the ANC, 
Zf. whereas, by way of preconditions for starting in-depth negotiations 
following the recent lifting of the state of emergency, the ANC called for 
the return of exiles, the release of political prisoners and the 
withdrawal of the army from certain black townships and, subject to these 
conditions, renounced its armed struggle, 
Zg. whereas, during the round of talks between the government and the ANC in 
Pretoria in August, the government agreed to create the necessary 
conditions for the return of political exiles and to release political 
prisoners starting from 1 September, 
Zh. deploring the dramatic increase in the violent confrontation between ANC 
supporters and the INKATHA movement which has already resulted in 
thousands of deaths and which may jeopardize the success of the 
negotiation process, if they are not stopped, 
Zi. noting the declaration on South Africa adopted by the European Council on 
15 December 1990, 
Zj. whereas Southern Africa has great potentia 1 to 1 ead the po 1 it i ca 1 and 
economic development of sub-Saharan Africa in association with other 
regions. 
regarding Namibia: 
1. Congratulates the people and the State of Namibia on their national 
independence, proclaimed in March 1990, and welcomes them warmly back into 
the international community; 
2. Draws attention to the exceptional example of the process of independence 
in Namibia, achieved following settlement of the conflict through 
negotiation and subsequently characterized by a spirit of openness and 
dialogue on the part of all involved, which led to the adoption of a 
constitution based on pluralist democracy and human rights; 
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3. Calls on the parties concerned to resolve the Walvis Bay issue by the same 
means; 
4. Urges the Council and Commission, as well as 
increase aid for the deve 1 opment of Namibia, 
framework of the new Lome Convention; 
regarding Angola: 
the Member States, to 
particularly within the 
5. Welcomes the re-establishment of direct talks between the parties in 
dispute, under Portuguese mediation and in the presence of observers from 
the USA and the Soviet Union; 
6. Urges the RPA Government and UNITA both to adopt more flexible positions 
so that a properly monitored ceasefire may be brought about without delay, 
thus enabling social and political life to return to normality, democracy 
to be established in the country, and full expression to be granted at the 
appropriate time to all political forces involved in reconstructing the 
country; 
7. Welcomes the prospects for political democratization, as seen in the draft 
constitutional reforms approved by the Central Committee of MPLA, which 
provide for a multiparty system; 
8. Calls on the Council, Commission and Member States immediately to increase 
urgent humanitarian aid to alleviate the desperate problems of famine in 
this country, in addition to the promised substantial and effective aid 
for the reconstruction and economic and social development of Angola; 
highlights by way of example, the agreement between the disputing parties 
which has enabled 'peace corridors' to be opened up, thus allowing 
international aid to reach the stricken zones; 
Regarding Mozambique 
9. Congratulates the Mozambican Government and RENAMO on the successful 
conclusion of the preliminary agreement whereby the Zimbabwean army will 
be concentrated in the Beira and Limpopo corridors and RENAMO will cease 
all offensive military action in these areas; 
10. Encourages the parties to continue the negotiations in the same spirit of 
dialogue, with the aim of achieving a complete ceasefire and peace in 
Mozambique, 
11. Welcomes the adoption by the Mozambican Parliament on 2 November 1990 of 
the constitution due to come into force on 30 November which makes 
prov1s1on for elections by universal suffrage and secret ballot, the 
creation of a multi-party system, equal rights for all religious faiths 
and the legitimization of private property alongside state property; 
12. Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States immediately to 
increase urgent humanitarian aid to the thousands of refugees dispersed in 
the neighbouring countries and to the victims of famine in Mozambique, in 
addition to the vital and substantial aid for the reconstruction and 
economic and social development of this country; 
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regarding the Republic of South Africa: 
13. Welcomes the unequivocal success of the negotiations in the latest meeting 
in Pretoria between delegations from the South African Government and the 
ANC, the final communique of which recognizes that the way is open for 
formal negotiations towards a new constitution that would eliminate the 
legal basis of apartheid and guarantee equal rights for all citizens; 
14. Hopes that all democratic political forces will be able to take part in 
these negotiations; 
15. Recognizes the crucial roles played throughout this process by 
President De Klerk and the ANC leader Nelson Mandela, who with 
determination, political courage and a clear sense of the higher interests 
of the country and its people, have tried to ensure that the conditions 
are created for peaceful transition in South Africa to a pluralist, fully 
democratic system along non-racial lines; 
16. Expresses its profound concern at the violent clashes between supporters 
of INKATHA and of the ANC and other groups made possible by the complicity 
of certain members of the South African police; takes the view that this 
violence may jeopardize the positive results of the negotiating process, 
but at the same time hopes for the success of the dialogue between 
representatives of the government, the ANC and all progressive forces; 
17. Welcomes the UN resolution unanimously adopted at the recent Forty-fourth 
session and, in accordance with that resolution, stresses the need to 
maintain 'the existing measures aimed at encouraging the South African 
regime to eradicate apartheid until there is clear evidence of profound 
and irreversible changes'; 
18. Calls on the Council, the Member State governments and the ACP governments 
to implement and monitor strictly all officially declared sanctions 
against the apartheid regime until such change has occurred; 
19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Commission and the governments of Namibia, Ango 1 a, Mozambique and the 
Republic of South Africa. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. Introduction 
1. A report on the political situation in southern Africa will encounter a 
number of difficulties at the outset, the first of which i~ the problem of 
defining the geographical area covered by this term which refers to an 
enormous African subcontinent without precise boundaries. A satisfactory 
solution to the problem would be to restrict ourselves to the situation in 
four states which are undergoing profound political changes Angola, 
Mozambique, Namibia and the Republic of South Africa - developments in these 
countries being decisive for the future of the entire region. 
2. In Angola and Mozambique, after fifteen years of independence and 
fratricidal armed conflict, negotiations have started aimed at bringing about 
national reconciliation and peace, while the one-party, initially Marxist, 
regimes are making significant progress towards democracy and multi-party 
systems. 
3. Namibia gained its independence following successful negotiations and an 
electoral process which was considered to be free and fair. Everything 
indicates that further progress will take place in an atmosphere of peace and 
political stability. 
4. In South Africa, although the legal foundations of apartheid persist and 
violent clashes among the population are on the increase once again, there are 
clear political indications of the changes called for by organizations 
representing the overwhelming majority of the people and supported by the 
international community. 
5. Another difficulty, as far as this report is concerned, is the rapid 
development of the political situation in the region under consideration. Any 
cons ide rations and propos a 1 s set out here may be overtaken by events, in 
particular by the negotiations taking place between the contending parties in 
South Africa, Angola and Mozambique. 
II. Namibia 
6. The New York Accords on Namibian i ndependence3 and 
fo 11 owed were a decisive factor in the creation of a new 
with clear repercussions throughout southern Africa. 
the events which 
political impetus 
The problem of Namibia was not the only matter at stake in these negotiations. 
Much broader interests were also concerned, involving the neighbouring states, 
the two superpowers and Cuba. All these countries therefore look part in the 
negotiations and solutions were found to matters such as, on the one hand, the 
gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops and the dismantling of SWAPO bases in 
Ango 1 a and, on the other hand, the military withdrawa 1 of South Africa to 
within its own borders. 
3 Concluded in December 1988. 
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7. The special representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mr Ahtisaari, 
considered the elections for a constituent assembly in Namibia to have been 
'free and fair', a view shared by inter alia the special delegation of the 
European Parliament which visited the country at the time. The South African 
President, Mr De Kl erk, accepted the e 1 ect ion results and emphasized his 
country's willingness to take part in constructive cooperation with the 
Namibian Government. 
SWAPO won a clear absolute majority (41 of the 72 seats) but failed to gain 
the two-thirds of the seats needed for it to adopt the constitution on its 
own. 2 
8. These developments show that it is incorrect, indeed slanderous, to 
maintain that universal suffrage and multi-party systems are not appropriate 
for certain African cultures. It is also clear that negotiation is the only 
means of resolving conflicts which is compatible with the fundamental 
interests of the populations concerned. 
9. The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly reached a satisfactory 
conclusion with the unanimous adoption of a text on 9 February 1990. In this 
connection, European Political Cooperation3 issued a statement warmly 
welcoming the fact that the process of self-determination of the Namibian 
people had effectively reached its conclusion, acknowledging the manner in 
which the Constituent Assembly had carried out its task in a spirit of 
understanding and reconciliation and looking forward to welcoming Namibia 
officially into the community of nations on 21 March as a fully sovereign, 
democratic and independent state. 
10. It must be recognized that the success of the Namibian independence 
process and the speed with which the constitution was adopted were due in 
1 arge part to the spirit of cooperation shown by the parties concerned, in 
particular SWAPO, whose actions and words gradually proved to be moderate and 
realistic. An example of this is the inclusion in the Namibian Government of 
individuals who are neither members of nor linked to SWAPO. 
11. The Strasbourg European Council 4 reaffirmed 
Community and its Member States to support 
newly-independent Namibia through aid programmes. 5 
stated that it was open to the idea of including 
Convention, should it wish to join. 
I 
the willingness of 
the development of 
The European Council 
Namibia in the new 
the 
the 
also 
Lome 
12. On 21 March the Namibian people celebrated ~heir national il')dependence. 
This occasion was, significantly, witnessed by i~ter alia the us; Soviet and 
West German Foreign Ministers as well as the President of South Africa. On 
18 April, by unanimous decision of the Security Council, Namibia became the 
160th member of the United Nations. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
The United Democratic Front 
remaining ten seats were shared 
Dublin, 20 February 1990. 
December 1989. 
(UDF) came second with 21 seats. 
by five other political movements. 
The 
The Community's aid programme for Namibia is set at 19 m ECU this year, as 
compared to 12 m ECU in 1989. 
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13. It should not be forgotten, however, that there is st i 11 a delicate 
territorial dispute with South Africa, which continues to administrate the 
enclave of Walvis Bay6 , an area claimed under the constitution of Namibia as 
an integral part of its national territory. UN Resolution 435, which laid 
down provisions governing Namibia's independence, did not solve this problem, 
given South Africa's refusal to give way, referring it instead to direct 
negotiation between the two states involved. 
III. Angola 
14. After more than a decade of armed struggle against the colonial power, 
Angola achieved independence in 1975, shortly after the revolution which 
liberated Portugal from the totalitarian regime which had governed it for 
nearly 50 years. 
The agreements concluded at the time in Alvor (Portugal) with the liberation 
movements which had waged the armed struggle were unable to prevent Angola 
from rapidly subsiding into civil war between the Government of the MPLA 
(People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) recognized by the 
international community and supported in particular by the USSR and Cuba - and 
UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) led by Jonas 
Savimbi, supported principally by the USA and South Africa. 
15. While negotiations on the New York Accords were taking place, the 
repatriation of the Cuban military contingent providing backing for the FAPLA 
(the Angolan armed forces) began and the South African army withdrew to within 
its own borders 7 • These developments enabled the two sides to conclude the 
Gbadolite Agreement with the mediation of President Mobutu of Zaire.s 
16. The agreement which was clearly dubious as far as its practical 
implementation was concerned - and the hand-shake between the President of 
Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and Jonas Savimbi had no lasting results in 
military terms. 
In fact, at the end of 1 ast year the FAPLA, claiming that there had been 
repeated violations of the cease-fire, launched a fresh military offensive 
against positions held by UNITA in the south-east of the enormous territory 
covered by Angola. The ensuing counter offensives included the sabotaging in 
April 1990 of Luanda's energy supplies, which made the already extremely 
precarious living conditions in the capital even worse. 
17. The Twelve, acting within the framework of European Political 
Cooperation, reiterated9 their appeal for an immediate cease-fire and the 
holding of direct talks between the parties and undertook to grant substantial 
and effective aid for the economic and social reconstruction and development 
of Angola as soon as the peace process allowed. 
6 The only deep-water sea-port on the Namibian coast. 
7 As a result of the agreement signed on 22 December 1988, the 50 000 Cuban 
troops stationed in Angola will be repatriated by July 1991. 
8 The agreement, signed on 23 June 1989 in the presence of eighteen African 
heads of state, announced that all hostilities would cease on the 
following day. 
9 Declaration of 6 April 1990. 
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18. The winds of democratization and institutional reform have also reached 
Angola- a country whose population has been decimated by nearly three decades 
of war, economic problems and, recently, famine throughout a large part of its 
territory. 
For example, the MPLA Central Committee has initiated an assessment 10 of a 
number of highly significant amendments to the constitution which may make 
peace a viable proposition. The Central Committee completed its work in July 
and the conclusions - to be submitted to the Congress in December - point to 
the need to develop a multi-party system and state explicitly that the Party 
must prepare to win its place in society on merit, without resorting to 
authoritarianism or repression. The conclusions specifically advocate the 
separation of State and Party. 
19. In the meantime the Tripartite Commission for the verification of the New 
York Accords, composed of representatives from Angola, Cuba and South Africa, 
together with observers from the USSR and the USA, met in Luanda11 and 
welcomed the resumption of Cuban troop withdrawals, which had been broken off 
in the summer of 1989. By 1 October this year, 76% of the total should have 
been repatriated, with the remainder (12 000 troops) returning by 1 July 1991. 
20. In recent months, the political situation appears to have improved, 
despite the continuation of military activity. Thus, on 7 April UNITA agreed 
to recognize the State of An go 1 a on the basis of the A 1 vor Accords and 
announced it was prepared to cease all hostilities. Subsequently, it 
recognized Jose Eduardo dos Santos as President of the People's Republic of 
Angola and indicated that it was not interested in joining a transitional 
government until elections were held. 
On 24 and 25 April, official representatives of the MPLA and UNITA established 
direct formal links in £vora (Portugal) following lengthy and delicate moves 
by Portugal's diplomatic services. A second round of direct talks, with the 
participation of the Portuguese Secretary of State for Cooperation, took place 
in Oei ras ( Portuga 1) on 16 and 17 June . 12 These contacts were resumed in 
August and were continuing at the end of September, still in Portugal. 
21. In the current negotiations, UNITA is calling for recognition by the 
Angolan Government, the setting of a date for free, multi-party elections and 
the creation of a unified army. It will accept a cease-fire only on these 
conditions. 
The government, for its part, is unwilling to recognize UNITA, claiming that 
this is impossible under the present constitution. It wishes to negotiate a 
cease-fire first. It is hoped that the current impasse can be resolved at the 
next round of negotiations, which will be attended by observers from the USA 
and the USSR (at the suggestion of the Portuguese mediator). 
10 
11 
12 
March 1990. 
5 March. 
The Dublin European Council (26 June) included in its final communique a 
positive reference to these talks, which were held under the auspices of 
Portugal. 
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IV. Mozambique 
22. The State of Mozambique came into being through a political process which 
was simultaneous to and in many respects similar to the case of Angola, except 
for the fact that the armed struggle against the colonial power was waged 
essentially by a single movement, FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front), which 
assumed power as a matter of course upon independence in 1975. 
23. However, in Mozambique, too, armed strife sprang up shortly afterwards 
with the emergence in 1977 of RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance), whose 
nature and origin were unclear and which until then had been virtually 
unknown. This movement, which was supported by South Africa in the initial 
stages, 13 carried out widespread guerilla strikes against military and 
economic targets14 as well as civilians. 
24. As the civil war spread, political, economic and social problems became 
more acute. Today, Mozambique is in a crisis with wide spread famine and an 
estimated figure of more than three mill ion refugees as a result of the 
conflict, of whom around 1.2 million are in Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
25. As in Angola, following domestic pressure as well as pressure from the 
international community, indirect negotiations have started between the two 
sides with a view to seeking a cease-fire and a peaceful settlement. 15 
Since then, a number of high-level diplomatic contacts have taken place, 
involving in particular senior officials of the State Department and the South 
African Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, the President of the 
People's Republic of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, has held talks in Nairobi 
with President Arap Moi of Kenya and President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who have 
taken on a mediating role in the peace process. 
26. There was a 1 ong break in negotiations, owing to the difficulty of 
reconciling the negotiating positions of the two sides, during which military 
hostilities continued. 
Initially, the essential differences were said to be caused by RENAMO's 
refusal to recognize 'the established order' (which apparently meant observing 
and recognizing the present constitution and the institutions based on it). 
27. FRELIMO, whi 1 e prepared to accept a revision of the constitution, will 
only agree to change the existing order through the present state bodies and 
using machinery established by law. It accepts the participation of 
individuals, groups or organizations in the political transformation process, 
provided that they comply with these principles from the outset. 
13 
14 
15 
Following a meeting held last December with President Chissano of 
Mozambique, President De Klerk reaffirmed that South Africa was giving no 
offici a 1 support to RENAMO and promised to take measures to prevent 
illegal aid being provided by private South African bodies. 
It practically paralysed the production and distribution of energy 
produced by the major hydro-electric project at Cahora Bassa. 
Nairobi, July 1989. 
DOC_EN\RR\101712 - 14 - PE 141.405/fin. 
RENAMO advocates a global agreement on national reconciliation- including the 
formation of a transitional government and the holding of elections to a 
constituent assembly- with a cease fire to take place afterwards. 
28. The preliminary draft revision of the constitution adopted in early 
September by the Central Committee of FRELIM016 points to far-reaching reforms 
and the abandonment of programmes and doctrines based on the mode I of the 
'people's democracies'. In particular, it advocates a multi-party system, the 
abolition of the leading role of the Party and freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press. 
If these constitutional amendments are implemented, the peace process is 
likely to be given an extremely valuable fresh impulse. If RENAMO's main 
demands are accepted, which would signify a clear commitment by FRELIMO to the 
democratization of Mozambican society, its negotiating position will be 
weakened and it will lose international credibility if it does not give ground 
on certain other claims. 
29. Clearly, this initiative by FRELIMO is likely to encourage the West to 
give more support to the Mozambique Government during the peace process and 
the economic reconstruction of the country. This emerged recently in 
Washington 17 : at a meeting with President Bush, President Chissano is said to 
have reiterated his wish to open direct negotiations with RENAMO as soon as 
possible and to implement the political reforms already announced. US 
assistance for Mozambique, both humanitarian aid and aid for modernizing and 
developing the economy, has been growing as the country has gradually moved 
out of the sphere of influence of the USSR. 
30. Meanwhile, direct contacts were planned to take place between the two 
sides on 12 June in Blantyre (Malawi) but RENAMO failed to attend, for 
reasons which have not been fully explained. Everything indicates that RENAMO 
demanded the prior withdrawa 1 from the 'Bei ra and Naca 1 a corridors tiS of 
military forces from Zimbabwe and Malawi and that this condition was not 
accepted. 
31. Lastly, from 8 to 10 June, direct negotiations between the two sides 
opened in Rome under the auspices of the Catholic Church (Community of Santo 
Egidio) 19 • The talks were attended by the Archbishop of Beira, 
D. Jaime Gon~alves. 
This first meeting achieved no spectacular results but the final communique 
shows the commitment of the two sides to 'finding common ground in order to 
put an end to the conflict and create political, economic and social 
conditions which will help bring about peace and normalize the lives of all 
Mozambicans'. A second round of negotiations was held in same place in 
August but was equally inconclusive. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
To be submitted to the People's Assembly in October 1990. 
13 March 1990. 
These 'corridors' provide access to the Indian Ocean for these countries. 
This Community has carried out important relief work in Africa, in 
particular amongst the people of Mozambique. 
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32. RENAMO refused to attend the third round of negotiations, planned for the 
second half of September, until the Mozambique army, acting in conjunction 
with the Zimbabwean army, halted the major military offensives said to be 
under way in the centre and north of the country. 
V. The Republic of South Africa 
33. With the election of President De Klerk on 14 September 1989, the final 
months of last year and the first few months of this year have produced a 
number of political developments which may lead to a decisive turning point in 
the situation in South Africa towards the full democratization of the regime 
and the complete abolition of apartheid, although this crucial objective, to 
which the overwhelming majority of the South African population aspires, is 
still some way off. 
In yielding to popular pressure, international diplomatic pressure and 
economic sanctions, the new South African Government has adopted a highly 
courageous stance in favour of democracy and has clearly paved the way for 
political reform. 
34. Thus, on 15 October, eight political prisoners, including seven ANC 
1 eaders, some of whom had been convicted in the Ri von i a Case a 1 ong with 
Nelson Mandela, were released. 
On 16 November, De Klerk announced he was requesting Parliament to abolish the 
Separate Amenities Act and had decided to abolish racial restrictions 
governing access to beaches. On 23 November, he signed a declaration stating 
that various areas were declared free trading areas. On the following day he 
announced the first four residential areas to be opened to all races, 
following the adoption of a law on free establishment areas. 
35. However, it was in a speech given on 2 February that President De Klerk 
announced far-reaching measures of exceptional political significance: 
the imminent unconditional release of Nelson Mandela, the historic leader 
of the ANC; 
the immediate legalization of the ANC, the PAC and the South African 
Communist Party and the abolition of restrictions on 33 organizations, 
including the UDF (United Democratic Front); 
the liberation of political prisoners held as a result of membership of 
or involvement in the above organizations, except those convicted of 
crimes such as murder, arson or terrorism; 
the suspension of executions of prisoners on death-row, until Parliament 
had considered a Bill abolishing the rule which makes the death penalty 
compulsory for certain crimes and guaranteeing the right of appeal; 
the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the media; 
the lifting of restrictions imposed on 
conditionally under the state of emergency; 
374 citizens released 
the abolition of the law on the separation of certain public amenitie 9 ; 
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the lifting of the state of emergency 'as soon as circumstances justify 
it I • 
President De Klerk also announced that he was prepared to negotiate with a 
view to achieving objectives acceptable to all South Africans, in particular a 
new democratic constitution guaranteeing the protection of minorities, 
individual rights and equality before the law. 
' 
In the sphere of foreign policy, he stressed the thaw in relations with 
neighbouring countries and called for a conference of the states of Southern 
Africa and the adoption of a joint reconstruction programme for the sub-
continent. 
36. The international community and the Community institutions gave a swift, 
positive response to these declarations, particularly following the release of 
Nelson Mandela after 27 years in captivity. 
From the public communiques and the resolutions adopted by the European 
Parliament (February part-session), the Commission (3 February) and European 
Political Cooperation (12 February), the following points should be noted: 
the measures announced are an important contribution to creating the 
conditions needed for a major national dialogue which will make it 
possible to adopt irreversible reforms leading to the complete abolition 
of apartheid by peaceful means and the installation of a fully 
democratic, non-racial regime; 
if these negotiations are to be fruitful, the state of emergency must be 
lifted20 , political prisoners amnestied and a climate of confidence 
established; 
aid must continue to be given to the victims of apartheid and economic, 
financial and diplomatic pressure on South Africa maintained, as the 
legal foundations of the apartheid regime are still in force. 
37. In September 1985 and September 1986, the Council of Ministers of the 
European Communities adopted two packages of restrictive measures concerning 
South Africa, the express aim of which was the complete abolition of 
apartheid. These measures included the following: 
20 
the wi thdrawa 1 of military attaches and a suspension of military and 
nuclear cooperation; 
an embargo on the export of arms and paramilitary equipment; 
a ban on the sale of oil and sensitive technology; 
A partial state of emergency was decreed in August 1985 and temporarily 
1 ifted between March and June 1986. On 12 June 1986 the authorities 
decreed a total state of emergency, to be renewed annually. The state of 
emergency was an instrument used, for example, to restrict the right of 
association and the right to hold demonstrations, as well as providing 
the basis for detentions without trial and measures to restrict freedom 
of residence and freedom of movement. 
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moves to discourage sporting and cultural links; 
a ban on the import of Krugerrands and certain iron and steel products; 
a recommendation for a halt to new investment in South Africa. 
It is difficult to quantify the direct and indirect impact of these measures 
on the South African economy. However, it is agreed that they had at least a 
political effect of undeniable importance on the South African authorities and 
the anti-apartheid movements. 
38. The Foreign Ministers of the Twelve, meeting on 20 February, were not 
unanimous regarding the continuation of sanctions against South Africa, a 
situation which affected the credibility of European Political Cooperation. 
The majority, in accordance with the resolution adopted by Parliament21 , took 
the view that, despite the positive steps already made, the ultimate objective 
of the sanctions - the complete abolition of apartheid - was still some way 
off, the state of emergency was st i 11 in force and there were st i 11 many 
political prisoners, so that any softening of economic sanctions would be 
premature and counterproductive. 
The UK Foreign Minister, however, considered that European companies should be 
authorized immediately to invest in South Africa, particularly in the light of 
Pretoria's promise to lift the state of emergency. On the same day, the Prime 
Minister announced in the House of Commons South Africa's unilateral decision 
to do this. 
At all events, a consensus was reached on the adoption of positive measures to 
help the victims of apartheid and on relaunching cultural and scientific 
cooperation, on the basis that such cooperation helps achieve the fundamental 
objective, which has not changed: the complete abolition of apartheid. 
Since then, following their visit to South Africa at the beginning of April, 
the 'troika' confirmed that economic sanctions would be relaxed only when it 
was clear that the process of dismantling apartheid was irreversible. 
39. On 17 and 19 April, President de Klerk announced major new measures to 
Parliament: 
the abolition during the current legislative period of the Separate 
Amenities Act (segregation in certain public amenities); 22 
the replacement next year of the Group Areas Act (segregation in 
residential areas) and the Land Acts (segregation as regards access to 
land ownership) by non-discriminatory systems. 
He also promised to abolish the definition of racial groups underlying the 
Population Registration Act but left the amendments to this act to the 
negotiation process, with the aim of reaching agreement on a new 
21 
22 
15 February. 
This law was abolished by a large majority in the three chambers of 
Parliament on 19 June. 
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constitution. 23 Lastly, he reaffirmed the principle of universal suffrage on 
condition that it be accompanied by constitutional protection for minorities. 
40. On 17 May the 238 state-run hospitals which until then had been reserved 
for whites were opened up to the whole population and a restructuring of 
services was announced in order to ensure equality of access to health care. 
At the same time, it was announced that the authorities were prepared to 
discuss the introduction of a single national education system. 
41. Finally, on 8 June the state of emergency was lifted, with the obvious 
exception of the province of Natal, where violence between rival black 
communities justified special security measures. 
42. Essentially, however, all political developments in southern Africa today 
are dependent and focused upon the negotiations between the South African 
Government and the organizations representing the population, in particular 
the ANC, with which the first preliminary meeting was held in May. Statements 
made by both sides at the end of this meeting justified cautious optimism 
regarding the success of the negotiations to follow. 
The prior conditions laid down by the ANC for the holding of negotiations on 
fundamenta 1 issues fo 11 owing the 1 i ft i ng of the state of emergency were the 
return of those in exile, the release of political prisoners24 and the 
withdrawal of the army from certain black areas. The Government stressed the 
need to abandon the armed struggle and normalize the domestic political 
situation. 
43. On 26 June the Dublin European Counci 1 adopted an important declaration 
on southern Africa. It repeated the call for all parties to renounce violence 
and to refrain from advocating violence and expressed a desire to encourage by 
all possible means a rapid opening of negotiations leading to the creation of 
a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. It also proposed an 
increase in funds for the programme of positive measures to support the 
victims of apartheid, in particular to assist the return and rehabilitation of 
those in exile. As regards sanctions, it was in favour of considering a 
gradual relaxation of pressure when it became clear that the process of change 
already under way had become irreversible. 
44. In August a new, highly successful round of talks was held between the 
Government and the ANC in Pretoria. The ANC finally announced the suspension 
of the armed struggle, while the Government undertook to pave the way for the 
return of political exiles, to start releasing political prisoners from 
1 September, to review certain aspects of the law on Internal Security25 and 
to reconsider lifting the state of emergency in Natal. 
Also of great importance were the part of the joint communique calling on all 
sectors of the population to seek a peaceful solution to their problems and 
23 
24 
25 
The text in question is a legal provision within the Constitution of 
South Africa. 
The Government accepted the conclusions of a working party set up during 
the contacts with the ANC to consider the issues of political prisoners 
and political exiles. Since then it has released 48 political prisoners. 
E.g. the ban on communism and the 'bannings' of individuals. 
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the commitment to taking steps to establishing machinery for communication at 
local, regional and national level. 
The way was thus left open for substantive negotiations on the adoption of a 
new constitution, in which the issue of dismantling the remaining legislation 
upholding apartheid and the delicate matter of constitutional protection for 
the rights of minorities will certainly be raised26 • 
45. Given the positive developments in the political situation in South 
Africa, the question of whether to relax or even lift completely the sanctions 
imposed on the country has now become particularly acute once again. 
Certain states agree with the ANC that any relaxation of sanctions would be 
premature so long as the legal basis of apartheid persists or at least so long 
as no significant progress has been made in the negotiations (which have not 
yet been formally opened) on the adoption of a new constitutional order. 
The European Parliament, for its part, adopted a resolution on 14 June in 
which it maintains that the sanctions policy must not be modified before the 
conclusion of a constitutional agreement. 
Other states believe that the process of democratization is already 
irreversible and that it is important to encourage President De Klerk to 
pursue his reforms and negotiations by bolstering his political position, in 
particular among the radical or sceptical sectors of the white population. 
They take the view that visible support from the international community, in 
the form of a relaxation of sanctions, could encourage the process of 
negotiation and accelerate the democratization of South Africa. 
46. Recently, the violent clashes between sympathizers of the ANC and the 
Inkatha movement have intensified and, if not checked, could compromise the 
negotiations. There is in fact a growing movement within the ANC which 
favours a suspension of negotiations and a resumption of the armed struggle. 
Once more, however, Nelson Mandela has achieved an internal political climate 
enabling the negotiations to continue. 
Much is expected of moves by the Government to strengthen the preventive and 
repressive security apparatus, and of the success of contacts at all levels, 
proposed by Nelson Mandela, between leaders of the two movements. 
26 According to leading members of the governing party, this objective could 
be achieved by setting up an upper chamber in Parliament representing the 
various socio-cultural groups. 
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INTROOOcriOl'f 
Though the situation in Southern Africa is changing rapidly at a political 
level since the liberation of Nelson KANDELA in February 1990, the underlying 
economic features of the countries which make up Southern Afrlca and their 
development needs are barely changing at all. For some of the countries of 
Southern Africa, most notably Angola and Moz:ambi.que, economic and social 
development have been retarded while the governments have been forced to spend 
scarce resources on defence measures and equipment. Because of the strong 
sense of solidarity which exists between the F.cont Line S·tatea all have borne 
the brunt of the effects of the wars being fought in Angola and Moz:ambique. 
The cost of the wars have been shared in di-fferent ways. Malawi, .for example, 
has housed and sheltered 650,000 Moz:ambi~an refugees; Zimbabwe has undertaken 
along with Tanz:ania to provide resources for the military protection of the 
Beira Corridor; Zambia has supported tens of thousands of refugees from Angola 
and from pee-independence Namibia. 
'l'he solldarlty which exists between the states of Southern Africa has alao 
manifested itself by the creation of the SADCC - probably the moat advanced 
and effective regional grouping on the African continent. Established in 
order to better coordinate efforts to t"educe dependency on apartheid South 
Africa, SADCC has proved pat"ticularly effective in canalising joint 
development efforts at sectoral policy levels. 
Trad.e policy and the moves towards the creation of a Southern African 
economic community have been led, not by SADCC, but by the Preferential Trade 
Authority of Eastern and Southern Africa. The PTA, based in Lusaka, has under 
very difficult circumstances begun to make progress in t"educing obstacles to 
tcade between the various countries in the region. 
rn spite of sU<:h common efforts, it must not be forgotten that the 
countries of Southern Africa are nevertheless very different in terms of their 
economi-c structures, their social structut"es, and indeed their political 
systems. In terms of their gross national product per capita the following 
comparisons are useful (source: World Bank, 1988). 
Angola 532 s 
Botswana lOSO S 
Lesotho 410 $ 
Malawi 160 s 
Moumbique 100 s 
Namibia 1272 s 
South Africa 2290 s 
Swa~:iland 790 s 
Tan~:ania 160 s 
Zambia 290 s 
Zimbabwe 660 s 
The above figures demonstrate that even if one bears in mind other factors, 
such as those proposed by the UNDP recently, development priorities vary for 
each country and needs also vary. The figures for Namibia should be treated 
with caution given very wide racially determined income inequality. 
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South Africa 
For the first time since the countries of SouthKn AfcLca obtained their 
independence from colonial rule, they are !ble to look forward to a. nev 
relationship with South Africa. The fact that South Africa now has a. chance 
of becoming a united, democratic and non-racial country is completely 
transforming the development perspectlve of the region as a whole. But 
although such change is nov possible it is by no means assured. Many things 
could happen which could destroy even the best made plana .for the abolition of 
apactheid. ret South Africa still holds the kay to the region's development: 
if democratic and non-cacial reforms are est!blLshed irreversibly, harmonious 
economic coopecation may follow; if negotiations between the South African 
Govecnment and the ANC collapse .for whatever reason and apartheid continues 
then the region will be forced to pay the price of more years of inatabil~ty 
and disruption. 
For these reasons it is crucial that economic and political sanctions 
against South Africa be maintained. Clearly the Lntecnational oprobrium for 
~he Whlte South African Government linked to the struggle within South Africa. 
for one man one vote has moved the South African Government in a direction 
which may otherwise have taken much longer. Sanctions must also be maintained 
because they provide President De Klerk with the means to argue against the 
extremist wing of his ovn party and against the extreme right that there is a 
bonus attached to a peaceful cesolution to the problem. Nobody apart from the 
~JCtreme eight has an interest in a violent solution to the problem. Having 
said that the scena-rio of prolonqed violence and even a possible coup d'etat 
aqainst President De Klerk cannot be excluded. Already the South African 
authorities themselves and the ANC have conflrmed the existence of extreme 
right death squads. The Minieter of Justice, 
Mr Koble COETSEE announced the appointment of a judicial inquiry into "hit 
squads" at the end of January 1990. 
The situation in the province of Natal is a cause of much eoncern where for 
more than fouc and a half years violent skirmishes and killings have occurred 
as a result of opposition between the £ulu Inkhatha Movement and the ANC. !n 
the Kvazulu tribal homeland, many groups have been armed directly or 
indirectly by the South African authorities in order to attack ANC targets. 
Aets of retaliation inevitably followed and Chief Buthelezi has done notning 
to calm the Zulu people vho he leads. While such fighting continues, it not 
only provides a reason for the South African Government to maintain a state of 
emecg~ncy in the region, it also promotes a negative image abroad of "blacks 
fightin<J blacks". This undermines the ANC negotiating position in spite of 
the fact that all the other South African homelands have pledged their suppo~t 
to the ANC and its allies. Nelson Mandala and other ANC leaders such as 
Walter Sisulu have made great efforts to bring about an end to the fighting in 
Natal and President De Klerk has declared that no arms are being provided 
officially to the violent groups in Natal. 
Yet sadly in August 1990 the Inkatha provoked clashes with ANC supporters 
spread to many black townships. Many independent witnesses have indicated 
military support by army units for Inkatha attacks. In spite of attempts by 
the government and the ANC to bring about an end to such unrest the situation 
remains extremely tense and worrying. The government must act to contain the 
security forces and punish offending units. 
000 
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The South African Government has itself admitted that sanctions work in 
spite of the fact that trade with European count~ies has continued. In 1989, 
according to the IKF Directory of Trade Statistics, South African exports to 
the larger EC Kember States were as follows (in millions US$): France- 755, 
Italy - 2621, Spain - 439, UK - 1465, West Germany - 1553. At the aame 
time exports to south Africa from these countries have increased. 
Foreign investment in South Africa from Europe and particularly from tha 
United states has been considerably reduced and many companies have withdrawn 
f~om South Africa. Even though the UK has lifted the ban on direct investment 
in Sou·th Africa, the recent Dublin Summit confirmed the Community policy of 
maintaining sanctions. The Council did agree to "consider a gradual 
relaxation of the pressure when there is clear evidence that the process of 
change alceady initiated continues". 
The Financial '1'imes has pointed out that capital sanctions imposed by 
bankers, not politicians, are by cor:amon consent the ones that have caused 
south Africa the most pain. '1'he effect of net capital outflows from South 
Afri~a has been considerable and equivalent to what would have been 
experienced had the gold price been 200 $ an ounce instead of 400 $ over the 
past five years. Consumer boycotts have also been an important political 
element in the sanctions campaign. Oil and arms embargos forced the South 
African Government into extremely costly self-sufficiency programmes whi~h it 
would of course have ~ather done without. The refusal of the US banks to 
~e~hedule RSA debt in 1985 led to increased pressure on the apartheid 
government to initiate reforms. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that South Africa has developed 
signifi~ant economic relations with many countries on the African continent 
itself. 32\ of its manufactured goods are exported within Africa. 12\ of 
south African foreign investment is made in Africa (1 billion US dollars in 
1988) • Two-thirds of South African exports to the African continent go to 
Malawi and the Front Line States. Zimbabwe sells 60\ of its manufactured 
products to South Africa. South Africa has managed to maintain such 
commercial links by building large storage areas in four African countries 
(Zaire, Cote d'[voire, '1'oqo and Rwanda) from where goods are resold. 
This indicates that although a post-apartheid·damocratic South Africa will 
have urgent internal development needs of Lts own, partic•llarly if it is to 
reduce the enormous wealth disparity between the whi.te population and the rest 
of the countcy, - to improve educatLon, health, housing, rural development and 
communications particularly in the neglected non-white areas it will 
neverthles• have a significant contribution to make to the development of the 
Southern Africa region a• a whole. Interestingly, following the independence 
of Zimbabwe and the consequent removal of aanctiona from the ex-Southern 
Rhodesia, the newly independent state managed an 8 par cent growth rate in its 
first year - and that at a time when the world economy was in a more deprived 
state than ia the case today. Nelson Mandala and the African National 
Congress have spoke of the need to create a Southern African Economic 
Community; similar ideas emerged from the recent SAOCC Conference. 
For the time being the international donor coaxnunlty must continue to 
provide humanitarian aid and assistance to the victims of apartheid in South 
Africa. In 1990 the European Community provided 30 million ECU and in 1991 
this figure is likely to be doubled at least. As Nelson Mandala mentioned in 
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h'is speech befoee the European Parlilllllent in Steasbourg, this has made a 
considerable contribution to alleviating difficulties experienced partLculaely 
in the black townships where education and health centeea have been supported. 
Now the European community must be prepared to extend ita aid in order to 
assist with democratisation process in South Africa. It should also involve 
itself directly or via the United Nations High Commission for Refugees with 
the organisation for the re·turn and resettlement of the tens of thousands of 
south Africans who were forced into exile by the apartheid system. The UNHCR 
will need to be able to work within South Africa as well. currently, aa a 
eesult of apartheid they are not able to do so. When a general amnesty is 
geanted urgent action will be required. The European Parliament must ensure 
that resources are made available in the 1991 Budget foe this. 
Southern African economy 
The development of the Southern African economy and ita accompanying social 
development is strongly conditi~ned by what happens inside South Africa. But 
each and evecy sta-te of Southern Africa has a sovereign responsibility to 
decide on ita own development priorities. In taking such decisions the 
governments of the states of Southern Afe~a have not in general been able to 
plan their country's future as the welght of i.nternatlonal economic factors 
has so feequently made them deviate from their original course. Their 
decision taking has therefore inevitably and generally been short-term, 
respondinq to dramatic changes in world prLces for minerals and raw ma~erials 
and not to theories of sound economic management. As elsewhere, costly 
investment projects in mi.ning or mineral extraction still had to be paid for 
even though receipts feom the exports of such materials slumped - thus 
aqgeavating the problems of indebtedness. Now that the region faces the costs 
of eeconstruction and economic integration, and given ·the urgent need for 
continuing emergency relief and development, special consideeation should be 
given by the member states of the European Coamunity to debt relief for 
Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tan:ania, Zambia and ELmbabwe. This i.s not to say 
that economic management and administration cannot be improved considerably in 
the counteies of Southeen Africa - on the contrary, improvement in management 
and administration is a sine qua non of their future development. But ·the 
degeee to which this is posslble depends very much on outside assistance 
partLculaely in higbee education and -technical training. 
In the last five years there has been an evolution ·throughout Southern 
Afeica in terms of general economic pollcy making. Those countries, such as 
Tanz:ania who for many years operated a highly centralised economy, have 
privatised much of the paraatatal sector in order to increase efficiency. 
They have also willingly or unwillingly gradually confo~ to the strictures 
of the multilateral financial institutions by diminishing the number of civil 
servants, devaluing currencies and trimming budgetary expenditure in general. 
The role of the private sector has been expanded and producer prices for 
agricultural products have been raised. In return such countries who followed 
these policy patterns were able to draw on new money from the World Bank and 
the IMF. 
Too frequently the first casualties of such policies have been the mass of 
tho population who have suffered cuta in the health and education field. Many 
donora including the European Community have attempted to bridqe this qap in 
resources by granting funda to allow government• to pursue their educational 
DOC EN/RR/101712 
- 25 - PE 141.405/fin 
and health proqrammea. Where the remedy baa bean •~•n aa being worse than the 
disease, the EC haa tried to atep in with •a human face• and save essential 
services. But ita resource a in apl..te of the Lome Convention, have been 
inadequate given the needs of the population. 
Countries such as Malawi and ~o a certain extent Swa.~iland have 
traditionally been more •free entrepriae• than many of their neighbours. 
Malawi • a agriculturally baaed economy provides 95\ of ita export ea.rninqa. 
However the economic base of the country responsible for ita foreiqn aa.rnin~s 
is extremely restricted depending almost entirely on la.rqe esta.ta-qrown cash 
crops in the banda of relatively few weal-thy ea-ta.ta owners. The large auua of 
the population are peasant farmers who have an increasing difficulty (partly 
as a result of floods followed by drought) in producing enough to survive. 
The 650,000 Ko:ambiquan refugees who occupy large parts of the southern part 
of the country have made the situation mora acute in apl-ta of maaaive inputs 
of food-aid. Malawi remains one of the world • a poorest countries and the 
ecarcity of land for the poor people in the midlands and the south, linked to 
the larqe number of ce.fuqeea, makes poverty even mora acute. 
swaziland, which is a member of the South African CUstoms Union and whose 
currency is tied -to the rand, haa an f:'COnomy which is baaed on privata 
entreprise. 83\ of the count·ry•a imports comes from South Africa and 37\ of 
ita exports go to South Africa. Ita economy is agriculturally baaed with 
over half ~he land being leasehold where moat of the population live. 
Freehold land of individual tenure farms provide 75\ of the country•• ·exports. 
Sugar is particularly important in this context and the Lome Convention 
provides valuable support for private suqar exporters. General standards of 
living are relatively high throughout the country and health and education 
programmes operate better than in many other countries of the region. 
The major economic power in the region apart from South Africa. would appear 
to be Botswana.. Both Namibia and Botswana rely heavily on mining and mineral 
-resources, including diamonds, for their income. In both cases the mining 
which is carried out ia done so by foreign conglomora.tes - most of the profits 
find their way out of the country to South Africa, the Uni~ed States, the U.K. 
and ~ermany. Unlike Namibia, Botswana ia Able to earn foreign currency from 
its lives·tock industry, with the European -coaxnunity securing much of this 
trade. The environmental impact of intensive livestock management 
pa~icularly by the large cattle ranches has been aavece and communal gra%ing 
land has also suffered the effects of drought and over-qraz:ing. Coming to 
terms with this ia clearly a development priority. Botswana has also tried to 
diversify ita economy but agricultural development outside of the livestock 
sector haa bean difficult aa local mai~e producers find their prices undercut 
by cheaper South African imports of mai%e. One of the consequences of this 
has been increased urbanisation. Botswana ia one of the few countries in 
Sou·thern Africa (and outside) to have an effective early warning system a.nd 
storage programme in the event of possible drought. In 1984 two-thirds of the 
population were racaivinq supplementary food-aid. 
Zimbabwe, having gained independence as a. result of a long querilla. war a 
decade aqo, has benefitted from a well developed transport infrastructure and 
reasonably productive agricultural sector. Economic growth in the early years 
of independence was only checked by the severe drought and a recession in 
metal and mineral prices. The economy has also had to bear the coat of high 
defence spending as a result of the war in Kor:a.mbique and a threat to 
Zimbabwe's own frontiers by RENAMO querillas. Unemployment haa become a 
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serious pcoblem in recent yeu:s as, tn spite of the gove-rnment • a policy on 
land distribution (land is sold on a willing-buyer, willlng-aellec basta, and 
none has been exp-ropriated f-rom the old landowners) people ace atlll moving to 
the towns. Though the government maintains a strong commitment to the service 
sector, it has been able to develop private indust-ry alongside heavier state 
involvement. 
The war situation which both Angola and Kozamblque have experienced since 
independence has, in parts of both countr1es, seriously limited food 
production and moat other types of income generating activity. The plight of 
war affected people- those displaced by the war or thoae.who have experienced 
direct suffering is acute. In a draft report prepared by the Government of 
Mozambique and the U.N., the prio-rity requirements for the 1990-91 period are 
detailed for 4 million war affected people. Particular attention b sought 
toe the 1.4 million internally displaced Mozambicans and 154.000 returnees to 
the country. 1 
~he Emergency appeal for 1990/91 emphasises direct humanitarian assistance 
such as emergency health care, supplementa-ry feeding programmes for children, 
seed and tool acquisition and distribution, improvement of water supplies and 
sanitation and other eme-rgency rehabilitation activities. This programme muat 
obtain ~ommunity funding; the previous appeal 1989/90 provided no pledges for 
institutional support to the WFP and the UNHCR with severe conaquences for the 
poorest and moat deprived populations. 
1990/91 Emergency Reauirements • Mozambique 
Summacy Financial Table 
Sector 
Food Aid 
Logistics 
Relief and Survival Items 
Agricultu.re 
Health 
Drinking Water 
Primacy Eduction 
P-rogramme of Assistance for Returnees 
lnsitutional Support 
Total 
US Dollars 
56.900.000 
34.000.000 
14.381.250 
8.120.730 
10.401.500 
910.200 
1.207.346 
6.600.000 
3.278.000 
135.799.026 us $ 
The World Bank has sponsored an Economic and Social Rehabilitation 
Programme in Mozambique which has been operational since the beginning of this 
year. consisting largely of infrastructure projects, it aims to complement 
the government's macro-economic reforms. 
1see details of the situation as regards refugees and displaced persona 
in the Report of the Mission of Enquiry on Refugees and Displaced Persona in 
Southern Africa of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, ( Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and Angola, April 29 - Kay 12 1989) (AP/10 of 24 July 1989) 
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Mo~;ambique • a economic problema have the!r roots in the colonial 
exploita.tiion of the nation's resources. Mo~a.mb!que aubaLdised both Portugal 
and. South Africa wf..th cheap coal, sugar and sisal as well as other tropi<:a.l 
pr0$1ucts. Independence led to a mauive exodus of qualified individuals, 
capital flight and immediate economic collapse. Collactivisa.tion and 
socialisation of the means of production were &t:a.rted, though since 1980 
liberalisation has gradually spread. But, the war with RENAMO has burnt the 
countries meag.re resources (42\ of the budget in 1986) and production of all 
major crops is below levels achieved in 1975. The country has already reached 
its limit for disasters both from war and from natural calamities including 
drought and floods. There are hopes for an end to querilla activity as the 
government and RENAMO, move towards peace talks. In June 1990, talks 
scheduled to take place in Malawi between RENAMO and the Government were 
postponed. They eventually began in Rome in mid-July 1990. Meanwhile RENAKO 
qroups continue to attack aid convoys and health centres within Ko:a.mbique. 
The economic sitauti.on in Angola. resembles that of Mo:a.mblqua to some 
extent, e~ept that the war with UN ITA has, if anything, coat the country 
de~rer; up to ~0 per cent of budget expenditure has been on defence. Only the 
of~-shore oil industry has managed to maintain production; 65 per cent of ita 
output is exported to the U.S. Petroleum constitutes a third of Angolan GNP 
and 90 per cent of ita export income. 
The potential wealth of the country far exceeds that of Mo:a.mbique however 
as Angola has impoctant mineral deposita currently under exploited due to 
military instability in the south of the country. COpper, manganese, diamonds 
anq phosphates are all to be found in considerable quantities. 
~et, the country is very poor in human resources and skills. When the 
~ubans began to withdraw they took with them not only military supplies but 
also medical equipment, doctors and qualified nurses. Large sectors of the 
country are now virtually without any health service, qualified doctors or 
medecines. Once again larqe scale humanitarian assistance is urgently 
required to help the 1.6 million internally displaced persona and local 
.population affected by war. Huila. Province in the south of the country, 
houses many of these displaced persona, yet few have access to even primary 
health care facilities; agricultural tools and seeds are also needed be'fore 
the rainy season begins. 
Angola has undertaken many economic and politl<:a1 reforms, has attempted to 
reform ita administrative structures, and has applied for the IKF membership. 
The EC is assisting with a. 35 mECU sectoral import proqra.ame but doing 
relatively 11ttle as far as humanitarian aid La concerned. This is something 
which must be remedied. 
Namibia having only recently achiQved independence now faces the challenge 
of promoting greater social equality with economic growth. Developments in 
Namibia are being keenly watched by the white population in South Africa and a. 
successful transition in Namibia will have important implications for the 
process of change in South Africa.. In this context, it is important for the 
international Community in general and the European COmmunity in particular, 
to pursue policies which help Namibia to sustain strong economic growth. The 
European Community must ensure that Namibia's terms of accession to the L~ 
Convention are as favourable as possible and that the full range of Lom6 
development assistance instruments are rapidly deployed. This may well 
require special attention to be paid to establishing Namibia's trading 
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relations with the International COmmunity after decades of economic 
isolation. 
In addition, the European Community should make additional reaourc:ea 
available for regional cooperation in Southern Africa, in order to facilitate 
Namibia • s early and effective incorporation into the SADCC Programme of 
Action. 
Regional coordination 
Cooperation amongst the countries of Southern Africa is more advanced than 
in other parts of the continent. Their mutual opposition to apartheid has 
pcovided them with a common cause: they have all suffered both economically 
and in human terms as a result of the deliberate policy of the South African 
Government. 
rn a study published by the UN Economic 
deatabilisation was determined to be the main cause 
setbacks. Increased support was requested from 
community for rehabU.itation progranmes, technical 
shelter and other primacy needs of the people of the 
Commission for Africa, 
of the region•• economic 
the international donor 
assistance, clothing and 
Front-Line States. 
The Fourth Lome convention contains a strenqthened section on regional 
cooperation with more resources which may be used by the countries of the 
region, via SAOCC, to i.mpcove industrial and agricultural production and 
extend communications and transport lnfrastcuctures. The last SADCC 
conference, early in 1990, emphasised the main themes of Enterprise, Skills 
and Productivity; it recognised also the need to better coordinate national 
macro-economic programmes and policies. A catalogue of good intentions is 
proposed. 
Until now regional coordination has been confined to different sectors of 
activity by the SADCC countries, with the SADCC secretariat providing the main 
organisational support in spite of its very small staff. SADCC has been 
mandated by its Member States ~or negotiating purposes with the European 
~issi.on. 
Conscious of the need to improve commecclal relations the SADCC countries 
have attempted to take on board the trade sector, conferring the task to the 
Tancanian Government. However, the existence of the Preferential Trade 
Authority (PTA) which covers Southern and Eastern Africa has led to 
complications and a duplication of effort. Given the advances made by the PTA 
it would seem appropriate to leave commercial matters with them for the time 
being particularly as they have succeeded in establ1shing a common list of 
goods eligible for tariff-free movement, a clearing house baaed in Zimbabwe to 
facilitate exchange and a number of other facilities assisting trade 
relations. Export promotion, in particular, could be given additional support 
by the EIB, for example, which could also assist SADCC'a Export Pre-~inancing 
Revolving Fund Schemes. 
Neither of these organisations as they now stand would be able to assume 
the responsibilities which will be required in the context of a future 
Southern African Economic Community (SAEC) - which the ANC amongst others 
envisages. SADCC has begun to reflect upon the implications of the 
development of an SAEC but no conclusions have yet been drawn. What is 
significant however is that for the first time Southern African States are 
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aacioualy envisaging a futuce without apartheid, and therefoce with a IDOCe 
coopec&tive and constructive southecn neighbouc. That, of course, changes 
everything. 
In development terms, and for the foreseeable ·future _SADCC wlll be able to 
continue to co.ordinate various infrastructure projects financed by the 
international community. What is not so clear is how to improve the 
efficiency of much of the humanitarian aid which is channeled to the reqion in 
order to assist the poorest sectors of the population. Regional co.operation 
could be atrenqthened in this context even though organisations do exht to 
facilitate food-aid operations. ~he World Food Proqramme has an area 
coordinator based in Zimbabwe; the UNHCR also has a Southern Africa raqional 
coocdinator. 
The European Community, which has deleqatLons in each Southern African 
st:ate including Namibia, has yet to establish a co.ordf.nating office. In 
addition, given the responsibilities and the work pressure on the members of 
staff of the diffecent detegati.ona, (the majority of whom ace technicians, 
engineers or administcative officials) insufficient attention is paid to 
humanitarian aid. Much could be gained, and humanitarian resource allocations 
bettec spent if each delegation in the region had an officer with specific 
responsibilities in this field. 
Conclusion 
The European Community and ita -Kember States are the main international 
donors in Southern Afri.ca. The European Parliament has consistently qi.ven 
consi.decable priority durinq the budget discussions to those linea which 
provide resources for aid to Southern Africa - indeed it was the Parliament 
which crea-ted these budqet linea (Linea 9530 and 9531, now Linea 7. 5070 and 
7. S071) • NGOs also make major contributions both -to relief and development 
efforts in the reqion. 
Particular efforts will be needed now, to support moves towards 
democratisAtion in the region in addition to continued support for 
humanitarian and infrastructure projects. Political pressure must' be 
maintained to encoucaqe the peace efforts in Angola and Ko~ambique. 
The complementarity which exists between the countries of Southern Africa 
and theic close political celationship founded on the struggle against 
apactheid must be maintained and enhanced in ocder that economic co.operation 
may be pcomoted 1110ce fully. The independence of Namibia has shown that 
political change even within South Afci.ca is possible, baaed on democratic 
principles. The Eucopean Community must endeavour through the maintenance of 
sanctions against South Africa until irreversible changes occur, and by 
increased development and co.operation to actively promote peace and 
reconciliation in the region. 
Reconunendations 
1. Resources for humanitarian relief operations should be increased, and 
emergency aid provided, for the countries of Southern Africa; assistance 
should also be provided to government structures which are often 
understaffed and ill-suited to deal with relief efforts and 
coordination. 
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2. The European Community should accelerate -the commitment of cesources 
provided under Lome IV for c~fugees and displaced persons. 
3. Particular priorities should be established to help children who a~e the 
casualties of war and who need special care and attention either provided 
by government sponsored institutions or by family groups and voluntary 
associations. 
4. Longer term -development efforts which are g~ared to an end to the 
conflict situation should be envisaged in order to regenerate the 
reqion's productive capacity, making it ~ss dependent on raw material 
production. 
5. More attention should be given to the region's food security in 
conjunction with SAOCC; in particular more use must be made of triangular 
food aid operations, food storage progcammes, the provision of tools and 
equipment, and early warning systems to help forecast ~ought etc. 
6. Continued support must be given to the development of the transport and 
communications networks in Southern Africa by the provision of ~aterials 
and equip~nt, including rolling stock for railways. While extend~ng the 
Nacala, Tazara, Lobito and Beira projects consideration ~ust be given to 
their co~plementarity with the South African transport system given its 
potential usefullness in an apartheid-free democratic South Africa. 
7. Sectoral import programmes, part financed by the European Community, 
which provide valuab~ spare parts and equipment for industry and 
transport should be continued and expanded. 
8. Training programmes both in technical and management subjects continue to 
~cit Community support; additional efforts need to be made in the 
educational sector at primary and secondary levels where NGO programmes 
-can be -co-financed by the 'Community. 
9. Commer-cial and trade cooperation ~ust be more substantially encouraged by 
the -community, notably by the provision of resources to assist the 
operations of the PTA Clearing House, in order to enable countries of 
Southern Africa to trade more amongst themselves. 
10. The EC should encourage its Member States to cancel all their aid debts 
starting with the least developed developing countries. On ~ultilateral 
debt, the EC should use its influence with SADCC's ~ajor creditors, the 
IMF and the World Bank, to press firstly for ~OrP concessional funds; 
11. Governments of Southern Africa should facilitate the granting of visas to 
NGO officials who often have difficulty in gaining recognition by the 
authorities and thus find coordination ~ore difficult when operating 
within a given region where cross-border operations are so~etimes 
necessary. 
12. More stringent efforts should be made by the political authorities in the 
Community to stop all private arms supplies to RENAMO and UNITA rebels 
and all other States, particularly the United States, s~ould be asked to 
do the same. 
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13. The European CoauDunity should provide financial resources to encourage 
the development of democracy in South Af-rica particularly by the 
creation of democratic: institutions in Southern Africa and in South 
Africa and enter into dicussions with all political parties which have 
now been legalised in order to see how such resources might best be 
spent. 
14. The European CoiiUDunity should not consider the possibility of opening a 
CoiiiiDission de~egation in South Africa until "profound and irreversible 
chang~" have taken place in that country as was cecognised by the 
European Council meeting in Strasbourg and Dublin. 
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